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UEFI Secure Boot and DRI

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Agenda



- Introduction
- RDK Boot Loader
- DRI (Disaster Recovery Image)
- RootFS Validation
- Build Environment



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Introduction

- Standardization of the RDK set-top box firmware boot process
 - Increase industry awareness of UEFI/EDK2 solutions for set-top boot implementation
- Need secure boot with chain of trust with secure keys
- Implement RDK Bootloader and Disaster Recovery Image (DRI) requirements (use cases) using well defined standard.



RDK Boot Loader

- RDK BootLoader selects the valid Platform Code Image (PCI) from the Device non-volatile memory to load and execute.
- Enables secure boot by registering PK and KEK Key.
- LoadImage protocol of UEFI Boot service is used to load the kernel image from boot partition.
- kernel arguments are passed using Loadoptions of LoadedImageProtocol.
- Installs the FDT blob into EFI system configuration table



RDK Boot Loader

- FDT file will be read and install Using gFdtTableGuid.
- To maintain chain of trust key to validate Linux kernel can be placed in partition other than Boot partition.
- Key which validates Rootfs can be placed in Boot partition and will be registered to UEFI variable and exported to Linux kernel.



RDK DRI

- RDK DRI reference implementation is UEFI application Resides in Flash memory and provides HTTP download method.
- Downloads PCI image file via Ethernet (USB to Ethernet interface) and store image into flash memory.
- DRI downloads Monolith Image comprised of 3 separate components
 1. Linux Kernel
 2. FDT file
 3. Root FileSystem



RDK DRI



- Linux and RootFs components are separately signed.
- Enabled USB host driver with support of Ethernet Adapter.
- Enabled Http drivers in Network Pkg.
- URL and IP details will be given to Http Driver
- After Downloading , Components are stored into different Flash partitions , and will validated prior to use.



RootFS validation



- After kernel secure boot , RDK wants rootfs also has to be authenticated.
- Kernel will bootup with temporary initramfs and will validates signed rootfs image and mount the same.
Yocto build command for creating initramfs:
INITRAMFS_IMAGE = "core-image-minimal-initramfs"
INITRAMFS_FSTYPES = "cpio"
- Keys to validate Rootfs will be exported to kernel through UEFI .



RootFS validation

- Kernel provides EFIVAR file system, which enables accessing UEFI variables from kernel.
- Sign RootFS using openssl and generate sha256 hash file which will be part of monolithic image to verify the signature.
Ex: `openssl dgst -sha256 -sign "Key.key" -out rootfs.sha256 rootfs.tar.bz2`
- Once secure Linux kernel bootup with initramfs, it validate rootfs ,untar and mount the rootfs.



Build Environment

- EDK2 by default, does not support Hikey board.
- Openplatformpkg based on edk2 supports various development boards such as RPI, ARM junos etc. including HiKey
- OpenPlatformPkg can be added as an extra Pkg to edk2, to support UEFI for HiKey
- RdkPkg need to be added to EDK2, which provides application to access driver from OpenPlatformPkg and boot Linux kernel.



Build Environment

edk2:

<https://github.com/tianocore/edk2.git>

Hikey UEFI Firmware:

<https://github.com/linaro-home/OpenPlatformPkg.git> -b hikey-rdk

Rdk boot Loader and DRI

<https://github.com/linaro-home/RdkPkg.git>

RDK secure Boot Build setup script : [Build script](#)





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Thank You

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